How do you calculate the ideal gas law constant? How do you find density in the ideal gas law? Does ideal gas law apply to liquids? Impact of this question views around the world. You can reuse this answer Creative Commons License. The initial meeting did not go well for Yamamoto since the Naval General Staff did not believe his contention that the attack would be so devastating that it would undermine American morale.
Their biggest concern was that the Pearl Harbor attack was simply too risky. Though the Naval General Staff remained opposed to the idea, it did agree that the annual war games would include an examination of the Pearl Harbor plan. These began on September 11 with the first phase focusing on the conduct of the southern operation. On September 16, a group of officers selected by Yamamoto, including representatives of the Naval General Staff, began a review of the Hawaii operation.
The results of this controlled tabletop maneuver seemed to confirm that the operation was feasible, but also served to confirm that it was risky and that success depended heavily on surprise. At the end of the two-day exercise, the Naval General Staff remained unconvinced. Basic concerns, such as whether refueling was possible to get the entire force to Hawaii and how many carriers were to be allocated to the operation, also remained unresolved. Yamamoto became enraged when he learned that once again the Naval General Staff had rejected his plan.
For the first time, fleet and midget submarines were included in the planning for the Pearl Harbor attack. The next day, there was a conference to review the plan, and where all admirals present were invited to speak. All but one was opposed to the Pearl Harbor attack. When they were done, Yamamoto addressed the assembled group and stated that as long as he was in charge, Pearl Harbor would be attacked. With the support of his own commanders assured, Yamamoto was determined to bring the issue to a head with the still skeptical Naval General Staff.
In a series of meetings on October 17—18, Yamamoto played his ace card. His staff representatives revealed that unless the plan was approved in its entirety Yamamoto and the entire staff of the Combined Fleet would resign. Since to Nagano the notion of going to war without Yamamoto at the helm of the Combined Fleet was simply unthinkable, this threat served to bring the Pearl Harbor debate to a close.
In the end, it was not logic that carried the day for Yamamoto, but the threat of resignation and it was not to be the last time that he would use this tactic. The staff of the First Air Fleet conducted the actual planning for the operation. However, the Japanese victory was fleeting. The attack did not end with the annihilation of the American Pacific fleet and resulted in massive US preparations for war with Japan.
The American public, divided in its opinion toward American involvement in the European war, was united in vengeance by the shock of the Japanese attack. In the wake of Pearl Harbor, the task force dispersed to assist Japanese operations from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and south toward Australia.
US aircraft carriers were tasked with disrupting Japanese operations in the Western Pacific. A high-profile early success, at least symbolically, occurred on April 18, , when Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle led sixteen B bombers that took off from the USS Hornet carrier and bombed military and industrial targets in Tokyo and several other cities across Japan.
The Doolittle Raid, although doing little real damage, put an end to the Japanese debate on aircraft carrier or battleship; all were united in support of sinking the American Pacific carriers. Yamamoto set out to devise the operation.
He planned to send a massive naval task force toward the Midway Islands. Yamamoto expected US aircraft carriers to help defend the area and be destroyed by IJN superior firepower, and his plan involved nearly the entire Japanese fleet.
The Japanese High Command had modified the original Yamamoto plan by including two additional operations: a diversion in the Northern Pacific and the occupation of Port Moresby, New Guinea, as a prelude to invading Australia. Yamamoto was left with fewer forces to execute the plan. As part of their diversion, the Japanese invaded the Aleutian Islands. Knowledgeable because of code decryption, the Americans refrained from sending forces, leaving the Japanese to idly waste precious military resources on the diversion.
Yamamoto allocated three out of ten aircraft carriers for the New Guinea operation. During the earlier May battle of Coral Sea, one Japanese carrier was sunk and two others damaged and out of commission for the decisive Midway battle. Yamamoto was also mistaken in dividing the attack force into four separate units hundreds of miles apart. His plan called for a level of cooperation hard to achieve using the technology of the time, and coordination between the forces was difficult.
The plan had several flaws, and Yamamoto made things more difficult by making a few key mistakes. His assessment of American strength was incorrect: the Japanese navy sunk only one US aircraft carrier in the battle of Coral Sea, not two as he had believed.
Yamamoto failed to locate the remaining two US carriers, which could have been easy if he had used intelligence-gathering techniques at his disposal, such as air patrol or monitoring; thus, he wrongly assumed the US ships were at Pearl Harbor. The IJN suffered a severe blow when four of its aircraft carriers were sunk.
Japan lost its momentum, and the offensive initiative gradually began to shift in favor of the US. The Midway defeat marked the end of the period of the most widespread Japanese expansion. Japanese industry could not match the rate of American manufacturing, and the IJN quickly found itself at a quantitative disadvantage in both aircrafts and ships.
Worse than the loss of the aircraft carriers was the loss of pilots. The Japanese program for fighter pilot training could not train enough new pilots to make up for the losses in such a short time. The Japanese perceived the Midway defeat as so bad that they forbade all participants to recount what happened.
Only in the early s did the Japanese public learn of the battle in which the empire lost its offensive edge through a major defeat. After Midway, Yamamoto was allowed to remain Combined Fleet commander, mostly to maintain morale among his men. Also, if Yamamoto were fired, the shameful loss would have been revealed. The defeat, however, cost him his status, and Fleet Forces Command could no longer afford to take any risks. Faced with an Allied offensive advantage, Yamamoto shifted to the defensive strategy of attempting to wear out the US forces.
The Japanese navy could only confront the Americans at night or when assisted by land-based aerial reinforcement. While the American victory was critical, the Battle of Midway did not mark the end of the war. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us!
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